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Abstract— Rules, regulations, and policies are the basis of 
civilized society and are used to coordinate the activities of 
individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. History has 
taught that over-regulation (too many rules) makes it difficult to 
compete and under-regulation (too few rules) can lead to crisis.   
This implies an optimal number of rules that avoids these two 
extremes.  Rules create boundaries that define the latitude an 
individual has to perform their activities.  This paper creates a 
Toy Model of a work environment and examines it with respect 
to the latitude provided to a normal individual and the latitude 
provided to an insider threat.  Simulations with the Toy Model 
illustrate four regimes with respect to an insider threat: under-
regulated, possibly optimal, tipping-point, and over-regulated.  
These regimes depend up the number of rules (N) and the 
minimum latitude (Lmin) required by a normal individual to carry 
out their activities.  The Toy Model is then mapped onto the 
standard 1D Percolation Model from theoretical physics and the 
same behavior is observed.  This allows the Toy Model to be 
generalized to a wide array of more complex models that have 
been well studied by the theoretical physics community and also 
show the same behavior.  Finally, by estimating N and Lmin it 
should be possible to determine the regime of any particular 
environment. 
Keywords-Insider; Threat; Percolation; Security; Strategy; 
Modeling; Simulation; Regulation; Policy 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Rules, regulations, and policies coordinate the activities of 
individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes [Brennan 
& Buchanan 1988] and are the basis of civilized society.  Rules 
are the primary tool for creating safe, secure, and fair 
environments for individuals, organizations, and communities 
[Schauer 1991].  Rules work by establishing acceptable 
boundaries for activities.  The space between the boundaries is 
the latitude individuals have to perform activities.  Over-
regulation (too many rules) provides insufficient latitude for 
individuals to accomplish their activities.  “History has taught 
us that over-regulated economies have difficulty competing” 
[Shore 1998].  Under-regulation (too few rules) is also bad and 
can to lead to crisis.  In particular, “if the spell of no crisis is 
long enough, the regulation level may drop to zero, despite the 
fact that the socially optimal regulation level remains positive” 
[Aizenman 2009].  This implies an optimal number of rules 
that avoids these two extremes [Barro 1986].  This paper seeks 
to develop models that qualitatively illustrate this behavior and 
can be used as a starting point for a more detailed, quantitative 
approach for determining the optimal number of rules in a 
particular environment. 
Decision latitude is the ability to make work-related 
decisions [Karasek 1979]. Rules create boundaries that 
determine the decision latitude of the individual with respect to 
a particular activity.  Low decision latitude can be associated 
with adverse health consequences, such as coronary heart 
disease [Kuper & Marmot 2003], due to increased workplace 
stress.  Measuring decision latitude or the distance an 
individual action is from an acceptable boundary has been 
mostly a qualitative endeavor. Crowd-sourced ethics is one 
method to measure the distance to a boundary [Casey & Sheth 
2013].  For example, asking individuals in a specific 
environment about the desirability (or undesirability) of a 
specific hypothetical action can be used to establish the 
quantitative distance that action is from an acceptable 
boundary. 
Breaking a rule involves crossing a boundary established by 
the rule.  Many boundary crossings are done to serve the larger 
goals of an organization [Umphress & Humphries 2011] or to 
maintain safety, order, or equality [Verkuyten et al 1994]. In a 
survey of over 2,000 executive assistants [Klieman 1996], it 
was found that:  
• 10% destroyed or removed damaging information; 
• 6.5% wrote documents with misleading or false 
information; and 
• 5.1% falsified vouchers or expense accounts. 
All of this activity was performed by employees to benefit their 
bosses and/or their organizations.  Such organizationally 
motivated boundary crossings may be the more frequent class 
of boundary crossing and may be indicative of low decision 
latitude and perhaps over-regulation.  For example, if a 
neighborhood has stop signs on every corner, it will increase 
the number of stop signs that are ignored.  Frequent boundary 
crossings effectively remove those boundaries and create 
opportunities for insider threats to increase their latitude. 
An insider can be defined as a current or former employee, 
contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized 
access to an organization.  Likewise, an insider threat can be 
defined as an insider who intentionally exceeded or 
intentionally used their access in a manner that negatively 
affected the organization [Silowesh & Nicoll 2013].  This 
definition excludes accidents, incompetence, or whistle-
blowers.  For example, Chelsea Manning was intentionally 
trying to do harm to the United States and would fall well 
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within the insider threat definition.   Edward Snowden believes 
he is a whistle-blower while the United States Intelligence 
Community believes he is an insider threat. 
One of the main goals of an insider threat is to increase 
their decision latitude.  This can be accomplished using a 
standard OODA loop [Boyd 1996]:  
Observe boundaries that are being crossed, 
Orient themselves to cross those boundaries,  
Decide to cross those boundaries, and 
Act on the new latitude they have achieved. 
Through this process an insider threat elevates their privileges; 
gains knowledge about control measures; and may be able to 
bypass security measures designed to prevent, detect, or react 
to unauthorized access [Myers et al 2009].  A typical example 
is an insider acquiring a co-workers password [Claycomb et al 
2013].  In addition, an insider threat can be defined as an entity 
that violates a security policy using legitimate access [Bishop 
& Gates 2008]. In an over-regulated environment, frequent 
boundary crossing by normal individuals allows the insider to 
increase their decision latitude by observing and mimicking the 
same behavior. 
Technological measures for addressing insider threats are 
an active area of research.  One approach is better 
cryptographic solutions [Yakoubov et al 2014] that add 
limitation to the use of information.  The costs of these 
approaches are a key aspect of their adoption and there is active 
research to develop technologies that minimize their limitations 
[Kepner et al 2014]. 
 Given the importance and cost implementing of rules this 
work attempts to provide models for estimating the optimal 
number of rules in the context of an insider threat.  This work 
follows a two-step approach.  Step 1 is a simple Toy Model 
based on a 1D concept of latitude.  The Toy Model allows 
simple estimates of the impact of rules on latitude and 
illustrates the key concepts of over-regulation, under-
regulation, and a tipping-point between these two regimes.  
Step 2 changes the terminology of the Toy Model to 
correspond to a Percolation Model.  Percolation is widely use 
model in theoretical physics for understanding a wide range of 
phenomena.  The Percolation Model leverages over 100,000+ 
journal articles on percolation [Stuaffer & Aharony 1992], 
critical phenomena [Hohenberg & Halperin 1977], phase 
transitions [Sinai 1982], and the renormalization group [Wilson 
1975,  Binney et al 1992] and allows rapid generalization of the 
Toy Model to more complex models that have already been 
well studied.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
behavior of the Percolation Model has been shown to be 
similar to that of many more complex models. Thus, the Toy 
Model is capturing the essence of the behavior found in these 
systems.  Using a more complex model may create more 
quantitatively accurate models, but it is likely that qualitative 
behavior will remain the same.  
II. TOY MODEL 
The Toy Model (see Figure 1) represents an rule based 
environment as a simple linear 1D domain of points X where 0 
< X < 1. Hard boundaries are placed at X = 0 and X = 1.  A 
normal individual performs their required activities within this 
domain. In the initial configuration the number of rules is N = 0 
and the average latitude of a normal individual in this 
environment is Lnormal(N=0) = 1. As new rules are added, new 
boundaries are created at random at a new location in the 
domain.  If there are N rules, there will be N internal 
boundaries.  Sorting the boundary locations in increasing order 
results in a boundary at X1, another boundary at X2, such that  
X1 < X2 < … < Xi < … XN 
Taking the difference between neighboring boundaries results 
in a sequence of N+1 latitudes 
L1  = X1 
L2  = X2 - X1 
… 
Li  = Xi - Xi-1 
… 
LN  = XN - XN-1 
LN+1  =   1  - XN 
The sum of the latitudes is always ΣLi = 1. So the average 
latitude for the normal individual in the environment is always 
Lnormal = 1/(N + 1) 
As more rules are added and more boundaries are created the 
average latitude of the normal individual decreases. 
   
 
(d) normal individual & insider threat 
 
(c) N = 2 boundaries ⇒ 3 latitudes 
 
(b) N = 1 boundary ⇒ 2 latitudes 
 
(a) N = 0 boundaries ⇒ 1 latitude: L1 = 1 
Figure 1.  Toy Model of an environment with a normal individual and 
an insider threat.  The environment has boundaries at coordinates 0 
and 1. Lmin is the minimal latitude required for normal activity.  From 
bottom to top: (a) no internal boundaries (N=0) implies a single 
latitude L1 = 1; (b) one internal boundary (N=1) implies two latitudes; 
(c) two internal boundaries (N=2) implies three latitudes, one of 
which is less than Lmin; (d) the latitude less than Lmin is eliminated for 
the adversary. 
0 1 
Lmin 
 3 
Let, Lmin denote the minimum latitude an individual needs 
to perform their required activities.  If any two boundaries are 
less than Lmin apart, then one of the boundaries is likely to be 
crossed.  The normal individual will mostly attempt to remain 
within these boundaries and so their average latitude is 
unchanged.  However, because the boundary needs to be 
crossed often, it is effectively removed for the insider threat.  
Boundaries that are likely to be crossed increase the average 
latitude of the insider threat.  The number of insider threat 
boundaries Nthreat is equal to the number of latitudes satisfying 
Li > Lmin.  As before, all the threat latitudes must sum to 1 so 
that the average threat latitude is given by 
Lthreat = 1/(Nthreat + 1) 
A simulation of the Toy Model behavior is shown in Figure 
2.  The code for this simulation is provided in the Appendix.  
Figure 2 shows the average latitude versus the number of rules 
for normal individuals and insider threats.   As expected, the 
insider threat latitude first decreases with the number rules, 
reaches a minimum, and then increases as the number of rules 
increases.  The minimum threat latitude occurs at 
Nmin = 1/Lmin 
If N > Nmin, then threat latitude increases. 
 
Figure 2.  Toy Model average latitude versus number of rules for a 
normal individual and an insider threat averaged over 100 
simulations.  Insider threat latitude reaches a minimum when the 
number rules is Nmin = 1/Lmin. 
The ratio of the threat latitude to the normal latitude is 
shown in Figure 3.  For modest numbers of rules the threat 
latitude is comparable to the normal latitudes.  As N 
approaches Nmin the ratio starts to increase.  In  this particular 
instance, the threat latitudes is ~3 times the normal latitude at 
N=Nmin.  The ratio increases dramatically as N surpasses Nmin.   
 
Figure 3.  Toy Model ratio of relative latitude of insider threat to 
normal individual. For modest numbers of rules the threat latitude is 
comparable to the normal latitudes.  As N approaches Nmin the ratio 
starts to increase.  In  this particular instance, the threat latitudes is ~3 
times the normal latitude at N=Nmin.  The ratio increases dramatically 
as N surpasses Nmin. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate four possible regimes that 
are described in Figure 4.  The regimes are under-regulated, 
possibly optimal, tipping point, and over-regulated.  In the 
under-regulated regime, the threat has a large latitude that is 
very similar to that of the normal individual.  At the tipping-
point, the threat latitude is minimized and the normal latitude is 
near the Lmin.  In the over-regulated regime, the threat latitude 
is increasing and the normal latitude is below Lmin.   We 
speculate that a possibly optimal regime exists between the 
under-regulated regime and the tipping-point. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Toy Model regimes.  In the under-regulated regime, the 
threat has a large latitude that very similar to that of the normal 
individual.  At the tipping-point, the threat latitude is minimized and 
the normal latitude is near the Lmin.  In the over-regulated regime, the 
threat latitude is increasing and the normal latitude is below Lmin.   
We speculate that a possibly optimal regime exists between the 
under-regulated regime and the tipping-point. 
III. PERCOLATION MODEL 
The Toy Model produces behaviors that are consistent with 
intuition: under-regulation, tipping-point, and over-regulation.  
However, it is not realistic to assume that complex human 
activities can be captured with such a simple model (at least not 
without more evidence).  A more realistic model would likely 
have additional dimensions and more complex interactions 
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among dimensions.  Conducting a detailed analysis of the 
implications of adding dimensions and more complex 
interactions would be an overwhelming undertaking.  
Fortunately, the theoretical physics community has already 
made this investment.  By changing the terminology of the Toy 
Model and converting it to a Percolation Model, it is possible to 
tap into this prior investment in theoretical work. 
Theoretical physics has extensively explored models of 
complex systems that show behavior similar to the Toy Model.  
These models fall under a wide range of names that include 
percolation, critical phenomena, phase transitions, and the 
renormalization group.  These models have also been applied 
to modeling forest fires, oil fields, diffusion, and a range of 
other phenomena [Stauffer & Aharony 1992].  
 
 
(b) Percolation Model with 3 sites: L1, L2, L3 
 
(a) Toy Model with 3 latitudes: L1, L2, L3 
Figure 5.  Toy Model and Percolation Model.  (a) Toy Model with 
three latitudes where L1 < Lmin.  (b) Percolation Model that is 
equivalent to the Toy Model in (a).  Site 1 is said to be occupied 
because L1 < Lmin. 
The simplest of these models is 1D percolation.  The Toy 
Model can be transformed into the Percolation Model in two 
steps.  First, the latitudes Li are “rotated” so that they are sitting 
on “sites” (see Figure 5) and when Li < Lmin the site is said to 
be “occupied.”  Second, the latitudes are turned into 
probabilities that the site is occupied.  The latitudes Li are 
sorted differences whose cumulative probability distribution is 
given by an exponential (see Figure 6) 
  P(N,L) = 1 - exp[-(N+1) L] 
This completes the transformation. Part of power of the 
Percolation Model is that it is effectively defined by only two 
parameters: the dumber of dimensions (in this case 1D) and the 
probability that a site is occupied (in this case P(N,L)). 
This probability also provides a mechanism for computing 
the exact solution of the Toy Model since 
Nthreat = (1 - P(N,Lmin)) N 
resulting in 
Lexact(N,Lmin) = 1/((1 - P(N,Lmin)) N + 1) 
                      = 1/(N exp[-(N+1) Lmin] + 1) 
The above expression is minimized when Nmin=1/Lmin and 
results in 
Lexact(Nmin,Lmin) = 1/(Nmin exp[-(Lmin + 1)] + 1) 
which for Lmin << 1 and Nmin >> 1 is  
Lexact(Nmin,Lmin) ≈ e Lmin 
Transforming the Toy Model into the Percolation Model 
connects it with the extensive theoretical work on percolation.  
One of the primary areas of study in percolation theory is the 
probability of clusters of occupied sites (i.e., areas of large 
latitude). The average size of a cluster in an infinite site 1D 
Percolation Model is [Stauffer & Aharony 1991] 
 S(P) = (Pc + P)/(Pc - P) 
where Pc is the percolation threshold.   For an infinite site 1D 
percolation Pc = 1.  In the Percolation Model of an insider 
threat the average latitude of a site is 
 Lavg = 1/(N+1) 
Combining the formulas for Lavg and S(P) gives the threat 
latitude in an infinite site 1D Percolation Model 
Lthreat = Lavg S(P(N,Lmin)) 
 
Figure 6.  Probability of a percolation site being occupied versus 
latitude.  Latitudes are sorted differences that are well modeled by an 
exponential distribution. 
Figure 7 compares the Toy Model value for threat latitude 
with the equivalent value computed using the Percolation.   The 
infinite site 1D Percolation Model is qualitatively equivalent to 
the Toy Model simulations.  Small differences between the 
models are due to finite site simulations versus an infinite site 
model.  Finite percolation models can also be calculated 
analytically, but they are beyond the scope of this work. 
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Figure 7.  Toy Model simulations of a normal individual and an 
insider threat along with the exact solution to the Toy Model and the 
infinite site Percolation Model.  All models are in qualitative 
agreement.  Differences are the result of the Toy Model being finite 
and Percolation Model being infinite.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The qualitative agreement between the Toy Model and the 
Percolation Model allows the Toy Model to be connected with 
far more complex models.  Percolation has been studied in 
many systems (see Figure 8) and all exhibit the same 
qualitative behavior that is determined by a single parameter P.   
This suggests the qualitative behavior of the 1D insider threat 
model may also be similar to higher fidelity insider threat 
models.  For example, in more complex percolation models the 
percolation threshold Pc gets smaller as the model gets more 
complex (see Figure 8).  This would mean that Nmin becomes 
smaller in more complex systems and that insider threat 
latitude starts increasing with a smaller number of rules. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Percolation has been studied in a wide range of systesms.  
The table shows a select few with varying number of dimensions, 
geometry and numbers of neighbors. Pc is the probability at which the 
system is likely to become fully connected. 
V. SUMMARY & FUTURE WORK 
Rules are the primary means of coordinating the activities 
of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes.  Over-
regulation and under-regulation can both be exploited by 
insider threats.  The Toy Model illustrates this phenomena 
quantitatively.  Adapting the Toy Model to the Percolation 
Model confirms this phenomena over a wide range models and 
connects its with a vast literature that has been successfully 
applied to many fields. 
 This work suggest that collecting specific pieces of 
information about the rules in an environment could provide 
incite into whether an environment is under-regulated, near the 
tipping-point, or over-regulated.  In particular, estimating the 
number of rules, boundary crossings, and Lmin could be use to 
identify the regime.  Possible approaches to collecting this 
information could be:  
• Counting the number of rules [Antoniou et al 1999], 
• Measuring the volume of materials used to describe the 
rules, 
• Examining the number of exception requests,   
• Examining the number accidental boundary crossing, and 
• Surveying the individuals in the environment about 
crossings.  
This work provides a rich theoretical framework for 
incorporating and understanding such data and increases the 
value of collecting such data. 
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APPENDIX: MODEL CODE 
The Toy Model and the Percolation Model can be 
computed using the following Matlab (or GNU Octave) code. 
 
Ntrial = 100;      % Number simulations to average 
Nrule = 1000;      % Maximum number of rules to test 
Lmin = 0.01;       % Set the minimum latitude 
Lnormal = zeros(1,Nrule);    % Initialize Lnormal 
Lthreat = zeros(1,Nrule);    % Initialize Lthreat 
 
% TOY MODEL 
for itrial = 1:Ntrial        % Loop over each trial 
  disp(num2str(itrial));     % Print trial number 
  X = rand(1,Nrule);         % Create boundaries 
  for irule = 1:Nrule        % Loop over rules 
    % Add 0 and 1 and to boundaries sort 
    Xnormal = sort([0 X(1:irule) 1]); 
    % Compute the normal latitudes 
    Ln = diff(Xnormal); 
    % Average and tally trial 
    Lnormal(irule) = Lnormal(irule) + mean(Ln); 
    % Eliminate boundaries below Lmin 
    Xthreat = unique([0 Xnormal(find(Ln>Lmin)+1) 1]); 
    % Compute the threat latitudes  
    Lt = diff(Xthreat); 
    % Average and tally trial 
    Lthreat(irule) =  Lthreat(irule) + mean(Lt); 
  end                        % End loop over rules 
end                          % End loop over trials 
Lnormal = Lnormal ./ Ntrial; % Avg over trial 
Lthreat = Lthreat ./ Ntrial; % Avg over trial 
 
% PERCOLATION MODEL 
N = 1:Nrule;                 % Number  of sites 
Pmin = 1 - exp(-(N+1)*Lmin); % Site probability 
SPmin = (1+Pmin)./(1-Pmin);  % Avg cluster size 
Lavg = 1./(N+1);             % Avg site latitude 
Lexact = 1./((1-Pmin).*N + 1);  % Exact answer 
 
% PLOT RESULTS 
figure; 
loglog(N,Lnormal,'b',N,Lthreat,'r',N,Lexact,'r:',N,Lt
hreatPerc,'r--',[1 Nrule],[Lmin Lmin],'k--'); 
xlabel('number of rules'); ylabel('average 
latitude'); legend('normal','threat','exact','1D 
Percolation','L_{min}','Location','North'); 
axis([1 Nrule 1/Nrule 1]); 
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